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View code. Please take note of the honest defender assumption The cannon cannon cannon cannon is an on chain interactive dispute engine implementing EVM-equivalent fault proofs. It's half geth, half MIPS, and whole awesome. It's Go code Directory Layout minigeth -- A standalone "geth" capable of computing a block transition mipigo -- minigeth compiled for MIPS. About On chain interactive fault prover for Ethereum Resources Readme. MIT License. Code of conduct. Releases No releases published.
Packages 0 No packages published.
Centralised staking pools—unlike centralised mining pools—are somewhat awkward because you have to trust the operator to behave properly with your funds. As for existing contracts, the entire eth1. Q: Are there any courses or subjects in uni that one should take to help in becoming a researcher? A: I'd say you need to be a good self-learner. Math, cryptography, computer science, programming, economics, networking are all relevant.
Q: Of proposed ways to tackle state rent problem, which one is your favorite? What do you think about resulting complexity from user point of view? The complexity is actually not so much in the rent itself, it's in how it changes the developer experience. The general approach is that application storage will need to be more "modular" and explicitly broken down into chunks associated with specific users, possibly with a fixed amount of "global" storage, plus some short-term storage not assigned to any user that goes away after some fixed amount of time, eg.
Could this be used in lieu of specialized hardware? If so, I imagine this could be a substantial time and cost saving measure in the quest for Serenity. A: TEEs can be used to generate randomness using delay. Unfortunately TEEs is trusted hardware.
We need a trustless solution : [Justin Drake]. A follow-up: Though I would add that trusted hardware could be a great thing for individual validators to use to increase their security. Q: What computer science problems still need to be solved prior to the release of Phase 1? A: For phase 0 we need locally-computable shuffles.
For phase 1 we want a custody scheme that is friendly to decentralised pools. Please message me if that sounds like your cup of tea : [Justin Drake]. Q: What happens to the beacon chain in the event of a controversial hardfork on the Eth 1. Will two beacon chains form? If not, what mechanism will the beacon chain use to determine which Eth 1.
How will this affect the transition of the Eth 1. It is my view that this trading pair must remain stable for a successful transition to take place. A: If not, what mechanism will the beacon chain use to determine which Eth 1. By default the beacon chain validators will just use the voting mechanism that's specified in the spec, and whichever chain a majority of the validators support is the chain that the beacon chain will go with.
That said, if we want to facilitate a peaceful split, there is a fork versioning feature built in to the beacon chain to make replay protection very easy Q: Why are you not doing "proper" research and submit publications to conferences? A: Not really an answer to your question, but Ethresear.
Q: Let's say that I have some ethereum locked on a time locked contract, will be available after the 2. This question can be expanded to all 1. A: The Ethereum 1. Q: Thoughts on this tweet? A: Eth 2. Hopefully some nice way to achieve 2 second average block times. Extremely effective cross-shard communication, either at base layer or through a variety of easy-to-use layer 2 systems. Will it be possible for a single DAPP to operate across multiple shards? Will L2 solutions be the only option?
A: A dApp would have to get really big to consume all the resources in a given shard to justify spreading itself over multiple shards. For example, Uber does less than 20 rides per second. A similarly popular decentralised equivalent would likely fit on a single shard, especially when fancy L2 infrastructure is involved e. Q: What is your take on the current state of finding consensus on randomness, in particular the current VDF construction. While certainly clever, I wouldn't say it is very elegant.
Do you think this is due to theoretical constraints or do do you see potential for a 'nicer' way? More general, are there any theoretical problems in this space, relevant to Ethereum 2. Is it the hardware you don't like? If so, would you agree that proof-of-work is an elegant solution?
Then think of VDFs as being "proof-of-work 2. It's a paradigm shift from massively-parallel work to inherently-sequential work. I'm not aware of any unbiasable randomness schemes that only have strong liveness, other than VDFs :. Will you be nearby?
Q: Shouldn't the smart contract stated in 4 have the ability of sending just 16 ETH for something as RocketPool v2 work while some consider this to be "centralization" I think it will help a lot the average user and mitigate the risk of the average user? A minimum balance of 32 ETH on the beacon chain is required for activation as a validator.
Q: I see a lot of people talking about nodes running in cloud. Shouldn't ETH find a way to actually discourage this? If everybody is running nodes in cloud that means we have possible single point of failure, which is against what I think we are trying to achieve and what enterprise customers are looking to eliminate.
A: "Partial slashing" and the quadratic leak during times of no-finality actually financially encourage diverse validator setups. Your potential losses are much smaller when your slashable message or validator down-time are discorrelated.
Diversity in setup includes -- node software, validation software, local server vs cloud provider and which cloud if using cloud , geographic region, etc. To guard against this, I should setup my validation node locally or on a less used cloud provider. A2: We do have a way! It's called "partial slashing" and the idea is that, if something goes wrong, the more people did something wrong the more everyone gets penalised.
So there is an incentive to avoid correlation with other validators, and hence avoid centralisation. Q: Can you foresee ever having to move Eth 1. A: The current plan is to incorporate the eth1. Note that this will just be a state root and an EVM interpreter along with eth balances. Users will be able to call into this contract by providing merkle witnesses of the required state. Q: I'm a new developer looking into Ethereum, where would you officially recommend I look to develop with an eye toward future proofing?
A: A key consideration to future proof your contract code for Ethereum 2. It's known as "storage rent" and "storage maintenance fees". Q: What do you guys think of the Avalanche consensus mechanism and could it play a role in the ETH roadmap further into the future? A: Avalanche is interesting to me because it's a fresh approach. Looking forward to seeing how it plays out with Bitcoin Cash.
Successes there can be ported to Ethereum via L2 infrastructure. Q: Is sharding smart contracts theoretically possible? How would one go about that? Q: How does eth 2. A: The key security guarantee of sharding comes from frequently shuffling validators into randomly-sampled committees known as "crosslink committees".
The hope is that this fast shuffling resists bribing attacks, in both the "honest majority" and the "slowly-adaptive rational majority" security models. Am I thinking about this wrong? A: Every shard gets security with the same notional value. Value validator collateral gets spread evenly across shards. This seems inefficient to me. Depending on how the distribution of value shakes out across shards, potentially materially inefficient?
A: This seems inefficient to me. Oh I see! Interesting point. We consider every shard equal, and provide high security for all shards. The breakdown of even a single shard namely, an unavailable or invalid crosslink would likely be catastrophic for the whole system. Q: Will the Beacon Chain require its own nodes? Is this basically a brand new chain that has only one connection to ethereum: Proof of Burn? In many ways this is akin to the FFG contract and sharding contract proposals that were previously deprecated but the organization breaks clean from the EVM to allow for a radically new design and increased efficiency.
If they run the beacon chain, they can then sync whatever shard chains they want. The connection at first is just an economic connection -- use the existing economics and community to seed validation in the beacon chain.
Beyond that, we expect the beacon chain to be used to finalize the pow chain in the short to medium term. In the end, there are a number of proposals to either fork the eth1. Q: How does Eth 2. If people run nodes at home on consumer hardware with a normal internet connection they can be taken offline easily with DDOS attacks or am I interpreting this wrong? A: It is the responsibility of a validator to remain online to fulfill their responsibilities and gain rewards.
A validator's inactivity penalties are also minimized if their being offline is dis-correlated from other validators. This incentivizes to utilize different node and validation software from the majority so that in the case of a ddos attack vector against a particular node implementation, your offline losses are minimized. The validator's protocol level identity and it's node's network identity are completely decoupled. This allows for a validator to create any type of obfuscated network setup that serves their purposes.
I expect many tools and best practices to arise for home validators in the coming months. Q: What are your thoughts on formal verification of smart contracts? Will this be possible with Ethereum 2. A: Formal verification of smart contracts is awesome and super valuable IMO. Formal verification will be possible in eth2. I believe the WASM semantics are already available in K which will provide some good opportunities for contract verification.
Opening up more languages by using WASM will also allow for utilization of more restricted languages that are more amenable to FV. Q: What are some good cypherpunk books that you would recommend to people getting interested in this space? Or just good book recommendations in general. A: I don't read many books nowadays.
I mostly consume academic papers, whitepapers, podcasts, videos, blog posts, Reddit, Twitter, etc. Basically will there be resharding? If so, how is resharding done? How are you solving the fast state syncing problem if nodes need to be reshuffled around shards? Right now crosslink committees are shuffled every epoch 6. Crosslink committees are critical, hence why there are shuffled fast.
See this answer also. Q: You said in a comment some days ago that there are basically no unsolved problems of Serenity Phase 0 left. Which problems of Phase 1 and 2 are still left to be solved? A: The short answer is there are no big fundamental problems for phases 0, 1, 2.
The more detailed answer is that for phase 0 we need locally-computable shuffles. For phase 2 we need to figure out sustainable storage. Q: Before Eth 2. A: Storing data on Ethereum is expensive per byte. Infrastructure like Filecoin may prove to be a good trustless storage solution. For privacy, just encrypt the data. Unfortunately those likely won't be ready for phase 0. Q: Is there some kind of roadmap for the migration from ETH 1. For true decentralization it is required to get more people on board that understand the full process.
A: ETH—at least when Ethereum 2. Fungibility is a key design goal. Q: Where does new client software take lists of peers with their ip addresses and ports? Is there is centralized server? A: This is an implementation detail. Some clients may have a hardcoded list of "bootstrap node" IPs and ports. A: Nothing final. Ultimately the community will have to make a tradeoff between low inflation and high security.
Q: What are the odds that a fully sharded chain including state transitions is feasible? A: Very high. No fundamental problems unsolved. The tricky part is getting everything to fit together cleanly. Q: Can I use a raspberry Pi to stake when staking is possible? And what do I do with it in the mean time? A: I tend to be critical of that class of systems.
A: Yes, there are already a number of experiments in eth1. Check out miximus for privacy and roll up for scalability both by barry whitehat! Q: Why is ETH 2. A: ETH 2. The reason we have phases 0, 1, 2 is to break things down conceptually, and in terms of incremental releases to limit risk. Q: What work is being done to make the research behind ETH 2.
Are there any efforts to translate research specifications into other languages? A: Are there any efforts to translate research specifications into other languages? Once the spec is more mature I expect the community to pick this up, somewhat similar to how Andreas's books get translated. English seems to be the a lingua franca for research and development. Q: After PoS, if a node gets hacked, can the hacker make the node to lose its stake by confirming false transactions?
A: When your validator gets penalised it is automatically deregistered to prevent further damage. We have a mechanism called "partial slashing". The idea is that, if something goes wrong with your validator it only gets penalised a bit if not many other validators also mess up around that time. So in the optimistic case of a lone hack you should recover most of your funds with your withdrawal key kept secure, e. A: That will likely be unlocked with abstraction which includes gas abstraction. Q: Assuming the number of network nodes remains the same and the network graduates to full PoS A: Rough ballpark figures.
Q: What is the most updated timeline for rolling out PoS? Since Vitalik already said 'research is done', what are developers' incentives to push things forward? Are there any specific measures taken to ensure a smooth transition? A: I expect the beacon chain the core PoS chain to launch late Ideally the spec should be close to final in Q1, cross-client testnets in Q2, security audits in Q3, mainnet launch in Q4.
So November and January would be my two best guesses. Having the Ethereum 2. For example: private eth network run in a shard connected to main eth network from which it takes just security from validators. Private transaction with ZKsnarks shard s. Encrypted data shards.
Erc20 like coin launched on ETH 2. A: Every shard has the same data availability layer, and the option to use EVM2. That's common base-layer infrastructure. At the application layer contracts can be powered by non-EVM2. There's also a huge L2 design around state channels, plasma, cross-shard communication, etc.
So at the application layer I expect lots of non-homogeneity across shards, as well as a lots of homogeneity thanks to standardisation. How much thinking is being devoted to the greater infrastructure requirements of Eth 2. A: PoS enables goodies such as economic finality and sharding. It is also much cheaper in terms of inflation cost for hodlers, as well as ecologically than PoW. Q: What do you feel is the biggest unsolved challenge left in Eth 2. A: I really honestly think that there are no unsolved research challenges at this point.
It's mostly "how do we make this thing more elegant and take up fewer lines of code and have fewer edge cases" on the research side. Better understanding the incentives and various actors that might arise in a stateless and highly abstracted execution model.
There is really great work being led by both the EF eWASM team and the Consensys Quilt team to better understand the design space and active build prototypes to vet ideas. Q: Previously, a release date of January for Phase 0 was informally articulated.
Do you feel this date is realistic and achievable? A: Thanks for noting its informality. We need: long-running test nets however that is defined , formal verification of the deposit contract, and clients to be ready for prime time, but right now it looks like everything will come together in time. We also don't want to rush clients into developing buggy software just to be ready by an arbitrary date.
If anything, I think BLS standardisation efforts are the most likely to slow us down. We as a greater blockchain community are trying very hard to have a standardised signature scheme for better interoperability between all the chains. There is a high degree of consensus on this already, but establishing a new standard is always a slow process. The client teams are doing a great job and continuing to push the envelope.
I expect exciting progress to be made in the coming months, but I also expect that the last mile might be long. Q: Are the researchers happy with the current state of the economics of Ethereum 2. A: I don't think it's productive for us to worry about the absolute numbers at this point; the network will launch, and either the rewards will prove sufficient or they won't. The other thing worth worrying about is centralization incentives, but that's difficult to work out "in theory land"; much of the result in practice has to do with how lazy people are.
Q: My biggest worry about ETH 2. A: Composability between shards is definitely unchartered territory but there are reasons to be optimistic:. The shards are designed for homogeneity unlike, say, Polkadot or Cosmos to facilitate cross-shard communication. There are design patterns which abstract away the boundaries between shards. For example, one could consider shards 0 and 1 as a combined data availability substrate for an execution engine which requires more bandwidth.
These design patterns will be more easily exploitable in the context of programmable execution engines. The shards are designed to be friendly to "fast optimistic finality" thanks to shard attestations which are somewhat analogous to block confirmations in the context of Eth1. What this means that is, in practice, the shards may act as one logical blockchain thanks to quick probabilistic finality of individual shards. A: My best guess is early See here.
Q: Under the specs there is a " block. A: In order for Eth2 to finalise Eth1, 2 things are needed, Eth2 must vote on Eth1 as is implemented as you point out and Eth1 must change its fork rule to follow the finalised blocks on Eth1. The latter requirement requires an Eth1 hardfork. It is therefore easier to just have validator finalise the things you mention for now and later on add in Eth1 finalisation. Additionally, it is safer to launch without Eth1 finalisation in case of a Eth2 black-swan event in the early days.
A: It got considerably simpler over the last year. If you do a word count on the spec, it seems to be considerably smaller than the yellow paper at this point. There's a lot of things in eth2 that are much simpler than eth1. But there's definitely lingering complexity and I deeply care about minimizing it. While the research path has been somewhat tortuous and hard to follow, the end product is arguably simple and clean.
Expect more educational material highlighting the simplicity of the current design. I expect phases 1 and 2 to be lines of code combined assuming WASM as primitive. That's just the phase 0 consensus deposit contract, beacon chain state transition function, and beacon chain fork choice rule.
Q: Why are there so many teams building eth2. I understand the point of client diversity but don't you think 6 clients seem to be pushing it? Supporting so many clients would also divide the resources in terms of funding.
Which clients do you see as the geth and parity of eth2. I expect specialisation—one can focus on the browser e. Lodestar , resource-constrained devices e. Nimbus , the enterprise e. Artemis , prototyping e. Trinity , etc. A minimum of two production-ready clients are necessary for launch.
I expect the first-mover advantage to be strong. We definitely don't want a duopoly! I expect a power law distribution, and it's definitely likely that some of the clients will not survive to see significant usage on mainnet. My guess on why so many clients showed up to do the hard work is that eth2. I'm pleased that there are so many great teams doing the hard work, but recently, I've been more focused on finding contributors to do value-add work outside of the core client implementation.
Formal verification, academic analysis of protocols, testing, light clients, web3 interfaces and developer tooling, validator clients with great UX that plug into any underlying node, etc, etc. Q: Are the Ethereum 2. For example, will Prism ever get merged to Geth? On Prism: "Likely not. Other than the language Go , Prysm and Geth have very little in common. Q: what happens when I stake 32 eth, and get slashed once? A: Validators get kicked out when they get slashed.
There is another ejection mechanism if your balance goes below 16 ETH from accumulating non-slashing penalties. There is an additional penalty related to the number of other slashable offenses that have occurred in the recent time period. If more validators have been slashed recently, you lose more ETH. This highlights the importance of having a discorrelated validator setup from other nodes and potentially having some fault tolerance setup with yourself before you sign things.
A: There are micro-penalties for not voting to finalise the same blocks as other validators and the inactivity penalty for offline validators for when the chain is not finalising for an extended period of time. Q: i hear a lot of hype around staking rewards, but what are the penalties for getting slashed? If your validator node goes offline for 18 days, and the beacon chain is not finalizing, then your balance will be reduced by "up to If a validator behaves provably maliciously, then they are slashed by having their balance reduced.
Assuming client software is written well, this should be basically impossible to happen to you. Minimum penalty is 1 ETH, but it goes up linearly in the number of people slashed at the same time as you. See here for more [Carl]. Important to note that if you are offline, but the chain is still finalizing you only stand to lose approximately the same as you would have gained.
A: The execution engine abstraction in phase 2 is quite exciting, taking account abstraction to the next level. It allows for the consensus part of execution to be an ultra thin layer of abstraction on top of data availability. Assuming WASM as a black box, it may be on the order of lines of code to specify. There's an initial proposal from Vitalik here.
The idea is that even the notion of a "transaction" is an application-layer detail which can be specified as WASM code. I'm lately most excited about this. I understand theres an effort to spread the cost out among various communities, but I think many people feel this might just end up being an expensive science project where the rewards dont justify the costs and if you itemised Eth 2. I appreciate that the researchers are a tackling a difficult problem with randomness for a blockchain.
I actually think the main value of the VDF is that it provides global trustable secure randomness to applications that need it. The other "promise" of VDFs is that they are a new cryptographic building block with the rather unique notion of time. They can used for proofs of space, proofs of replication, proofs of history, anti-frontrunning, expiring zk-proofs, and hopefully further applications which are hard to predict today.
Q: I'd like to know more about the data availability layer of Ethereum 2. Part of my political platform includes integrating blockchain technology with government operations. For example, I'd like to see all of America's public records stored on a public, open source, sufficiently decentralized blockchain. Would it make sense to build something like this on top of Ethereum 2. Why or why not? A: Realistically you would want an incentivized data storage platform like Swarm, with hashes of the documents stored on the ethereum blockchain.
But I'd recommend thinking harder and trying to figure out how to answer the deeper question "how could we use blockchains as a tool to minimize opportunities for misbehavior in government? An internal-use stablecoin where only government agencies can hold balances but transactions are visible to and auditable by the public.
Get your country I'm speaking generically to all readers here :D to make an Estonian-style E-ID system that lets people make digital signatures that can be verified by anyone publicly. This is not technically a blockchain application, but it would be a tool useful in many blockchain applications [Vitalik]. Are there any other researchers on the research team that are as convinced of Ethereum's future, besides Vitalik and Justin of course? No need to call someone out.
Just percentages, ie. A: Somewhat ingrained in our culture, the research team doesn't talk much about net worths. Having said that, the research team has a lot of fresh blood e. The aforementioned Carl here, let's put it this way: financially, emotionally, and intellectually, I am heavily exposed to ETH.
Q: How many Eth2. A: I asked the same question a few days ago. At this moment, it is still an open question and will likely be until much loser to the time. Obviously having more clients is better, but that should be played off against the launch date. I am currently torn between 2 and 3. At the end of the day, it will come down to who is ready and when.
Q: I understand that about 10 million eth is expected to provide good enough security for the network. As i understand, the side with less total eth staked will be slashed, so won't this malicious actor be able to effectively kill the network? One of the beautiful things about PoS is that these attacks can be handled with grace.
We, as a community, can go in and hard-fork out the malicious actors so they have no more voting power. The malicious actors just burnt a lot of money to temporally halt a network. Q:Do the client teams feel their implementations will be sufficiently robust enough, stable enough, and easy enough to use that normal nerds like myself can safely run their node software, stake 32 ETH on it, and not be slashed or lose ETH due to client bugs?
My biggest concern is losing ETH while being a well intentioned actor. One key component in the incentive design is that penalties for going offline and for being slashed are only high if many other validators go offline at the same time. So any bug that doesn't hit every node at the same time should only cost you a minimal amount. Q:suppose ethereum reaches 1 mllion tps, ledger size will grow 1 terabyte everyday, any solution to this? A: The sharded eth2. This is not necessarily state size.
The current approach to state and state execution is to take a "state-less" approach in which blocks must contain the merkle witnesses of the relevant state to perform the tx executions. This is reduces the amount of state any consensus node must store, but does bring up other issues about state size, who stores it, how users get it, etc.
Much of the state rent research that ledgerwatch has driven in the past year or so will likely come into play. Question 1: Would staking be made easy-to-do, so "ordinary" people can earn interest on their holdings? Question 2: Does staking pose any risks of losing ETH by accident? Trying to understand if you can stake without any risks unless you "intentionally" try to harm the network eg.
I expect a cottage industry will be setup around accessibility. Infrastructure to be built includes staking pools centralised—think Coinbase—as well as decentralised one as well as plug-and-play "validator in a box" solutions. Trying to understand if you can stake without any risks unless you "intentionally" try to harm the network. Penalties should be marginal for validator nodes that go offline for short periods of time every once in a while.
A: The current approach is to fold eth1 into eth2 as an execution environment. In practice, this will mean that we would need to have a hard fork on the eth1 side to rebalance some gas costs opcodes that read storage or read accounts would see their gas costs increased to , and after that at some point there will be a "flag block height" from which the eth1 state root will be moved into the eth2 system or possibly some one-time processing will be run on the eth1 state to make some optimizations, eg.
Q: Regarding Proof-of-Stake and wealth distribution and issuance reduction , by the looks of it the majority of ETH will be held by the minority of entities, does that cause any concern since a single entity can run multiple validator nodes and earn more rewards? It's a question from inequality perspective not security; if ETH were to take a significant role in the global economy, wouldn't this widen the gap between rich and poor by orders of magnitude MUCH worse than the current economic system?
Basically, economic inequality on steroids. A: I definitely think income inequality issues from crypto are an issue! It's a big part of why I am not a single-cryptocurrency maximalist. But I still think that PoW is not better than PoS from an inequality point of view, because although PoW does distribute coins into "fresh hands", you need so much capital to become a PoW miner that PoW itself is a big rich-get-richer mechanic in practice.
Q: I know its still early but are there some rough estimates of when we might see Spec freezes for Phase 1 and 2? That said, the current minimal execution design with EEs for phase 2 once better researched and prototyped is a super simple addition on top of phase 1 [Danny]. Q: Please ELI5 "explain like I'm five" why the need for a second chain instead keeping on evolving the first one?
We would be constrained by the Eth1 gas limit, which would severely affect performance e. We would be mixing the consensus and application layers. This means the consensus layer is subject to the application-layer DoS vectors e.
It would also mean "enshrining" application-layer contracts, which is far from ideal from a governance standpoint which should be as neutral as possible with regards to deployed contracts i. The DAO interventions should be the exception, not the norm.
We would be constrained by the EVM, which is notoriously hard to safely program complex contracts in. We would be subject to the Eth1 block time Poisson distribution as opposed to the regular—and shorter—slots durations in Eth2. Q: I am considering to stake during phase 0, but i am a bit concerned about the inactivity leak.
I am asking this as there may be certain situations in which I think I will be offline for a while, and I do not want my balance to slowly leak out due to that. The incentives are deliberately designed to be forgiving to avoid discouraging amateur setups to promote decentralization.
A: With shards, and validators in a committee, a minimum of , validators are needed to crosslink every shard every slot. In this case, security is obviously insanely degraded, but the protocol can technically move forward.
But yes, below the , validator 4. Q: if i understand finalization correctly, the more validators you have the longer it takes to finalize. A: Correct. In Eth2, more validators should not lead to significantly longer finalization times.
By making use of BLS signature aggregation and by grouping the validators into committees, we're able to support hundreds of thousands and hopefully into the millions of validators. What's your opinion on this? I'd say this would be the remit of the community, not the EF. Note that the Eth2 designers avoided giving early validators a special reward e.
We want to learn whether or not the basic incentivises are sufficient to incentivise participation. I actually like the idea of an NFT. The deposit contract is readable in such a way that proofs can be made to a separate contract to generate NFTs. Been talking to Austin Griffith about this. I don't think an NFT would hinder our ability to understand the pure incentivizes here. It's at best a trophy and of little economic value imo.
Q: How is the work on evaluating the feasibility of producing dedicated VDF hardware coming along? A: At this point there's reasonably high confidence that VDFs including building hardware are viable. A few updates:. A team of 3 ex-Intel people Simon, Sean, Kelly from Supranational is dedicated to the hardware aspects.
The Rivest timelock challenge open for 20 years, designed to last 35 years was cracked in a few months using an FPGA see here, and here. There's also code on Github. Work by Erdinc Ozturk has improved the state-of-the-art circuit depth for the modular exponentiation in VDFs.
The ePrint paper was submitted a few days ago and should be published soon. A prominent complexity theorist Ryan Williams from MIT is working on circuit depth lower bounds for modular multiplication. Significant progress was made by Ligero on the RSA ceremony. We are planning for a ceremony with unprecedented scale participants in In addition to the Ethereum Foundation and Protocol Labs i. Filecoin , a new blockchain project to be announced with the FPGA competition is helping with funding.
Q: Is there a chance for obligatory anonymity of future validator withdrawals? Force every withdrawal to go to a shielded pool - like zcash does with mining rewards. A: I definitely support moving toward more and more privacy being a default over time! I'd say validator deposits are more important to mix than withdrawals, as that way it becomes harder to locate the nodes of specific validators which seems like it would increase security and censorship resistance. Q: What are the main incentives to run a beacon node for validators if they can just connect to high-up time beacon nodes?
If there are beacon node providers with high up-time - how is this going to be decentralized? A: There is an anti-centralisation incentive mechanism baked in. Basically, validators get punished for going offline the more other validators are offline at the same time. So "uncorrelated downtime" should be optimised in addition to "high uptime". Q: If, as a validator, I know that I'm going to be offline for a period of time, is is possible to 'pause' validating without suffering an inactivity leak?
It's safe to be offline during that time, but it does prevent you from re-entering. If we want to, in some future version we could add a "re-enter" feature that allows immediate re-depositing without waiting to withdraw first Q: Do we have clarity yet on whether currently locked-down smart contracts eg metronomes 4 contracts by Jeff garzik will continue to work seamless in ETH2. And how can storage costs be added to locked-down contracts in ETH 1.
In other words can we all assume immutable contracts on ETH1. A: The current plan is that eth1 will be folded into eth2 as an execution environment via the stateless client approach, in which case, yes, contracts will keep working as expected.
Can QCs just monitor the entire blockchain and automatically attempt to hijack any transaction with insecure signature scheme during one blocktime, even if the sender has no previous outgoing transactions? A: Even if a quantum computer gets announced as immediately usable tomorrow, it is possible to do an emergency procedure to secure the funds of everyone who has not yet publicly released their public key or a signature ie. Winternitz signatures. Finality greatly mitigates the sync latency bottleneck, and the requirement for consensus participants to store historical blocks.
I'd also add that I expect light clients to be massively more viable in eth2 than in eth1. About the same order of magnitude load as a bitcoin light client to stay synced as opposed to eth1, where light clients are not light enough in practice to run on phones Any wiki, tips, or advice on how to proceed contributing and profiting for Ethereum? A: Eth2 has no mining. Q: Approximately when is ETH issuance supposed to drop dramatically? I believe the figure I've come accross is 10x reduction in issuance, is this correct also?
Further reductions would happen when the PoW chain stops entirely. If so, are there concerns exchanges will list ETH 2. Will this change? A: In Eth2 the economic security is not a direct function of the block rewards. Instead, it is a function of the total amount at stake. Q: As ETH 2. I'd say it's likely there will be a bi-directional bridge eventually though unlikely to happen in Even better than a bi-directional bridge based on light clients, which comes with non-negligible latency is native integration of Eth1 into Eth2 see here.
Q: Will the issuance rate be enough to incentivize validators given the competition from say DeFi products and will it be changed in the future if needed? But over time I do expect interest rates on ETH to slide up as more forms of staking become available eg. I would think arbitrage would solve the issue but haven't thought too deeply on the subject myself.
In paticular, if ETH 1. The greater the price delta, the greater the incentive to deliver a two-way bridge ASAP. Q: Is it still the plan that the frequently rotated notaries perform stateless validation of the blocks? If yes, are there any insights into how much extra network overhead will sending blocks with merkle proofs incur?
If no, is there any other mechanism to prevent adversaries that can corrupt a shard quickly from applying an invalid state transition? Is it still the plan that the frequently rotated notaries perform stateless validation of the blocks?
Now that execution engines are application layer, the answer is technically 0 : For execution engines that use large Merkle trees e. Eth1 the rough estimate at one point was 8x. Validators can send a deposit of 32 ETH to the deposit contract which is then transferred to the beacon chain where they can begin validation.
If Eth2 has an Eth1 execution engine, then it could be pretty painless, but even if not, an ERC20 token could just be transferred by copying over its state root. Q: Sorry in advance if my questions are dumb but I didn't follow closely Ethereum 2. Rewards depend on the total number of validators, individual validator performance, and the gas markets. I'm proud to have been able to make a contribution in a beautiful piece of infrastructure I believe will radically change the world in a positive way :.
Q: When sharding is released, will there just suddenly be shards in existence, or will there be a small but growing number of shards as usage goes up? A: All shards will be launched at once. Growing the number of shards is probably unneeded complexity. Shards with lots of unused capacity will have lower gas prices attracting more users.
Q: How can the average person help with eth2. Are there any organized efforts underway? A: Educating yourself enough to feel comfortable to participate as a validator would be fantastic : [Justin]. Q: After the scaling issues are solved will this be an economical platform to host backend logic on? How will this compare to running your own server or going through a cloud hosting company in terms of cost and ease of use for light or heavy workloads?
A: It's unlikely that Eth2 on its will be used as a backend for heavy workloads, the data throughput is likely just too high. That said, it works really well as a dispute resolution layer so a centralised service can run the backend optimistically and if someone disagrees with the execution, they can contest and have it resolved on Eth2.
Does the circulating supply of ETH 2. Unfortunately, it is not quite that simple. Eth2 is such a big upgrade over Eth1 that it is easier to implement as an entirely new chain than to upgrade. See Justin's ELI5 here for more. The large majority of it, yes. Rewards are also issued on the Eth2 chain so that increases the supply there too. A: My concern with doing something like this is its inflexibility. It is basically impossible to cover all the possible cases and even if we could, I'd argue that such an approach is too inflexible to handle the intricacies of exactly how something has failed.
Handling it on a case-by-case basis seems like a better solution to me. Q: Are there any plans to have the ETH 2. For example like proposed with Casper, every th block will be validated by PoS. The committee responsible for crosslinking a shard block changes block-by-block. Shard committees that solely build shard chain blocks are a future topic. However, for a shard to communicate with other shards, it needs a beacon committee to crosslink it to a beacon block.
The diagram is a combined depiction of what happened in three slots. In Slot 1, a block is proposed and then attested to by two validators; one validator in Committee A was offline. The attestations and block at Slot 1 propagate the network and reach many validators. In Slot 2, a block is proposed and a validator in Committee B does not see it, thus it attests that the Beacon Chain head is the block at Slot 1.
Note this validator is different from the offline validator from Slot 1. A validator can only be in one committee per epoch. Typically, there are more than 8, validators: meaning more than one committee per slot. All committees are the same size, and have at least validators.
The security probabilities decrease when there are less than 4, validators because committees would have less than validators. At every epoch, validators are evenly divided across slots and then subdivided into committees of appropriate size.
All of the validators from that slot attest to the Beacon Chain head. Each of the committees in that slot attempts to crosslink a particular shard. A shuffling algorithm scales up or down the number of committees per slot to get at least validators per committee. As an example, assume 16, validators. The validators for Slot 1 are then subdivided into four committees and pseudorandomly assigned to shards.
Assume that Shards 33, 55, 22, 11 are the shard assignments. In another committee, validators attempt to crosslink Shard Another validators attempt to crosslink Shard For Slot 2, the process repeats. The validators for Slot 2 are subdivided into four committees and pseudorandomly assigned to shards. Assume that Shards 41, 20, 17, 15 are the shard assignments.
All validators for Slot 2 attest their views of the Beacon Chain head at Slot 2. The committees attempt to crosslink Shards 41, 20, 17, The process repeats for the remaining slots in the epoch. Each validator has a slot when it can speak up, attest and crosslink. At the end of the epoch, all 16, validators have had a chance to attest and crosslink.
But so far the validator votes have been slot-specific rather than epoch-specific. All 16, validators have not voted on the same thing. A checkpoint is a block in the first slot of an epoch. If there is no such block, then the checkpoint is the preceding most recent block. There is always one checkpoint block per epoch. A block can be the checkpoint for multiple epochs. Note Slot 65 to Slot are empty.
The Epoch 2 checkpoint would have been the block at Slot Since the slot is missing, the Epoch 2 checkpoint is the previous block at Slot Epoch 3 is similar: Slot is empty, thus the previous block at Slot is the Epoch 3 checkpoint. Epoch boundary blocks EBB are a term in some literature such as the Gasper paper , the source of the diagram above and a later one , and they can be considered synonymous with checkpoints.
This vote is called a Casper FFG vote , and also includes a prior checkpoint, called the source. In the diagram, a validator in Epoch 1 voted for a source checkpoint of the genesis block, and a target checkpoint of the block at Slot In Epoch 2, the same validator voted for the same checkpoints. However, all validators cast FFG votes for each epoch checkpoint. Pedagogically, suppose there are three active validators: two have a balance of 8 ETH, and a sole validator with a balance of 32 ETH.
The supermajority vote must contain the vote of the sole validator: although the other two validators may vote differently to the sole validator, they do not have enough balance to form the supermajority. If a checkpoint B is justified and the checkpoint in the immediate next epoch becomes justified, then B becomes finalized.
Typically, a checkpoint is finalized in two epochs, On average, a user transaction would be in a block in the middle of an epoch. Use cases can decide whether they need finality or an earlier safety threshold is sufficient. The epoch boundary block at Slot 96 is proposed and contains attestations for the Epoch 2 checkpoint. This causes the justification of the Epoch 2 checkpoint, and thus the finality of the previously justified Epoch 1 checkpoint.
The finality of Slot 32 immediately causes the finality of all blocks preceding it. When finalizing a checkpoint, there is no limit to the number of blocks that can be finalized. All the crosslinks contained in the beacon blocks from Slot 1 to Slot 32, would lead to the finality of the shard chains. In other words, a shard block is finalized when it is crosslinked into a beacon block that is finalized.
With the same illustration, here is a storyline that could have been observed from genesis. All the proposers from Slot 1 until Slot 63 propose a block, and these appear on-chain. The block at Slot 64 is proposed and it includes attestations for the Epoch 1 checkpoint.
The block at Slot 96 is proposed and it includes attestations for the Epoch 2 checkpoint. Justifying the Epoch 2 checkpoint finalizes the Epoch 1 checkpoint and all prior blocks. Here is another possible scenario. Consider only until Epoch 1. In this case, the checkpoint would have been justified before Epoch 2. A checkpoint can be justified in its current epoch, but its finalization requires at least the epoch after it.
The justification of a block can sometimes finalize a block two or more epochs ago. The Gasper paper discusses these cases. They are expected only in exceptional times of high latency, network partitions, or strong attacks. Finality reduces complexity with cross shard communications. Optimally, all validators submit one attestation per epoch.
An attestation has 32 slot chances for inclusion on-chain. This means a validator may have two attestations included on-chain in a single epoch. Validators are rewarded the most when their attestation is included on-chain at their assigned slot; later inclusion is a decaying reward.
To give validators time to prepare, they are assigned to committees one epoch in advance. Proposers are only assigned to slots once the epoch starts. Nonetheless, secret leader election research aims to mitigate attacks or bribing of proposers. Committees allow for the technical optimization of combining signatures from each attester into a single aggregate signature. In eth2 Phase 1, validators will also receive rewards for crosslinks.
Attestations in finalized blocks are worth more. On the flip side, validators get penalties for not attesting or if they attest to blocks that are not finalized. Before outlining less common penalties and rewards, you may want to know your downside risk in becoming a staker. The day example means that falling offline for a few days or weeks, is a much smaller penalty: dropping offline for 36 days would lose around 0.
Slashings are penalties ranging from over 0. An honest, secure validator cannot be slashed by the actions of other validators. The validator is penalized as if it was offline for 8, epochs. The protocol also imposes an additional penalty based on how many others have been slashed near the same time. Proposers of blocks that get finalized, obtain a sizable reward. When a slashing happens, proposers also get a small reward for including the slashing evidence in a block.
Ethereum 2. The designed rewards and penalties culminate in an inactivity leak penalty. This is severe and rare unlike typical risks in 3. Basically, if there have been more than four epochs since finality, validators suffer an inactivity penalty that increases quadratically until a checkpoint is finalized.
The inactivity leak does not drain validators that are operating optimally. During an inactivity leak, attester rewards are zero; validators earn proposer and whistleblower rewards as usual. There are three slashing conditions for validators. A double proposal is a proposer proposing more than one block for their assigned slot.
Here are two examples based on a scenario that a validator made an FFG vote in Epoch 5 with a source of Slot 32 and target of Slot A double vote is a validator casting 2 FFG votes for any two targets at the same epoch. This can happen during a fork. The blue arrows are two FFG votes, one voting for a target block at Slot on the left fork, and another voting for a target block at Slot on the right fork.
A validator casting both votes, commits a slashable offence called double voting. Above is an example of a double vote where the source checkpoints are different. Next, a scenario where a double vote has the same source Epoch 0 checkpoint and the targets are different. Because there was no block proposed at Slot 64 in the lower fork; recall the section on Beacon Chain Checkpoints. A double vote is when a validator casts FFG votes for two targets at the same epoch.
An intuition behind slashing double votes is so that validators vote for one chain, rather than two or more forks. A whistleblowing validator needs to include the conflicting votes to prove that another validator should be slashed. Efficiently finding a conflicting vote among a large history is an algorithms and data structures challenge linked in the conclusion.
A validator is in total control to avoid getting slashed: it only needs to remember what it has signed. An honest validator cannot be slashed by the actions of other validators. As long as a validator does not sign a conflicting attestation or proposal, the validator cannot be slashed.
A validator client may use multiple beacon nodes for factors like better uptime, trust, and Denial of Service protection. In these setups, or where a backup validator client is used, users need to be careful that the validator does not sign conflicting messages. Each validator needs a balance of 32 ETH to get activated. A user staking 32 ETH into a deposit contract on Ethereum mainnet, will activate one validator. In any voluntary or forced exit, there is a delay of four epochs before stakers can withdraw their stake.
Within the four epochs, a validator can still be caught and slashed. But a slashed validator incurs a delay of 8, epochs approximately 36 days. Further technical details are described in A note on Ethereum 2. To avoid large changes in the validator set in a short amount of time, there are mechanisms limiting how many validators can be activated or exited within an epoch.
For example, these make it more difficult to activate many validators quickly to attack the system. The Beacon Chain uses a deeper concept of effective balances which change less often than validator balances and enable technical optimizations.
The Ethereum blockchain, one of the most important, has decided to update its terminology to fight scams and end confusion. One of the most common scams in cryptocurrency is the giveaway scam. The giveaway scam can take many forms, but the general premise is that if you send ETH to. Proof-of-work is the mechanism that allows the decentralized Ethereum network to come to consensus, or agree on things like account balances and the order of.